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conduct by supervisors is not occurring."s Liability should be imposed upon
the employer for discriminatory acts by low level employees unless the employer has taken reasonable steps to insure that there is a discriminationfree working environment.2 9 This test clearly states when the employer will
be liable for employee actions and makes it easy for employers to understand what must be done to avoid liability. It also more effectively implements the policy of the Missouri Act to end employment discrimination
because it requires that the employer take reasonable steps to insure that
there is no discrimination occurring at any employee level.
DUANE E. SCHREIMANN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A COMPARISON OF MISSOURI
AND FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR STATE AID
TO NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Americans United v. Rogers'
The corporation Americans United challenged the constitutionality of
the Missouri Financial Assistance Program, seeking a declaratory judgment
and injunction to prohibit enforcement of the statute which provided
tuition grants to college students attending approved public and private
colleges. 2 The trial court held the program unconstitutional as a violation
of the first amendment of the United States Constitution and of several
provisions of the Missouri Constitution.' The Missouri Supreme Court
reversed, sustaining the constitutionality of the statute under both state
4
and federal constitutions.
It has long been recognized that the Missouri standard for maintaining
the separation of church and state is more restrictive than the federal
approach.5 This is partially the consequence of the numerous Missouri
28. The application of this test to the facts in the present case would arrive at
the same result. Since the supervisor was acting in his supervisory capacity (hiring),
the proposed test would impose liability.
29. Those "reasonable steps" could include such actions as weekly management visits to the various departments of the business to see that there is no
discrimination occurring, instructing employees to notify the employer immediately if they feel they have been or are being subjected to discrimination, employer
supervision of any disciplinary actions, etc.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. En Banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 653 (1976).
§§ 173.200-.235, RSMo (Supp. 1975).
Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7, art. III, § 38(a), art. IX, § 8, art. X, § 3.
538 S.W.2d at 713.
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376, 386 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd
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constitutional provisions specifically prohibiting appropriations of money
in aid or support of any religious creed, church, or sectarian denomination. 6 In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has established a constitutional policy which sanctions the absolute separation of church and state in
educational matters. 7 The combination of this absolutist approach and the
restrictive constitutional provisions has resulted in a series of decisions in
which the Missouri Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional appropriations of money to support parochial schools as part of the public school9
private schools,
system, 8 to provide transportation to children attending
10
children.
school
parochial
to
textbooks
loan
to
and
Under the less restrictive federal approach, state aid to non-public
schools is permissible under the first amendment when the state aid has a
secular purpose, does not have a primary effect which advances or inhibits
religion, and does not tend to excessively entangle the state in church
affairs." Following these principles, the United States Supreme Court has
mem., 419 U.S. 888 (1974); Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. En Banc
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111 (1975); Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No.
8, 364 Mo. 121, 138, 260 S.W.2d 573, 582 (1953); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808,
816, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (En Banc 1942). A good discussion of the development of
Missouri's unqualified policy of absolute separation of church and state prior to
Rogers is contained in Kurtz, ConstitutionalLaw-An UnqualifiedPolicy on PublicAid
to Non-Public Schools, 40 Mo. L. REv. 342 (1975).
6. Relevant state constitutional provisions are set forth as follows:
That no person can be compelled to erect, support, or attend any place or
system of worship, or to maintain or support any priest, minister, preacher
or teacher of any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion ....
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 6.
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of religion, or in aid
of any priest, preacher, minister, or teacher thereof ....
Mo. CONST. art. I,

§ 7.

Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school
district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation
or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious
creed, church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any
private or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other
institution of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination. ...
Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8. In Rogers the Missouri Supreme Court particularly focuses
upon the issue of what constitutes "aid" or "support" within the meaning of these
provisions.
7. Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 816, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (En Banc 1942).
See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
8. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8,364 Mo. 121,260 S.W.2d 573
(1953); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (En Banc 1942).
9. McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (En Banc 1953).
10. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. En Banc 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1111 (1975).
11. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). The "primary
effect" test has been substantially refined in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/6
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sustained state appropriations which provide transportation to children
attending private schools, 12 loan textbooks to parochial school children,"
provide federal construction grants to private colleges,14 provide tuition
grants directly to non-public colleges, 15 and provide parochical school
children with standardized testing, diagnostic, therapeutic, and remedial
services. 16 On the other hand, where state aid has been given to schools
which are so permeated by religion that students are "coerced" into conforming to religious pressures exerted through the educational process,
the Court has invalidated the aid as an abridgment of the first amendment
free exercise clause. 17 As a practical matter, such "coercion" is likely to be
found at the primary and secondary levels but not at the college level
because college students are less susceptible to religious indoctrination, and
because the atmosphere of academic freedom on
college campuses
8
minimizes the opportunities for sectarian influence.1
In view of the prior Missouri decisions prohibiting the use of public
money to provide assistance of any kind to private schools, the Rogers
decision indicates a departure from the traditional policy of absolute separation of church and state. It marks the first time that the Missouri
Supreme Court has sustained statutory appropriations which result in a
flow of money into private educational institutions.
The first factor the court used to distinguish Rogers from the prior
Missouri decisions prohibiting aid to non-public schools 19 was the concept
that the statute was designed and implemented for the benefit of the
students and not the institutions. 20 Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court
adopted the "child benefit" theory in determining that tuition grants to
students attending private colleges did not constitute "aid" or "support" to
In Hunt the Supreme Court has determined ihat aid has a primary effect other
than the advancement of religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a
substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission
or .when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.
Id. at 743.
12. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977). Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
14. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
15. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
16. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
17. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973)(prohibitng tuition grants to non-public elementary and secondary schools);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)(prohibiting salary supplements to

teachers of secular subjects in non-public elementary schools); McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)(prohibiting released-time instructional programs
conducted in public schools for religious purposes).

18. 538 S.W.2d at 721.

19. See notes 8-10 and supra accompanying text.

20. 538 S.W.2d at 720.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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the institutions as prohibited by the Missouri Constitution.2 The court in
Rogers rejected the contention that state funded tuition payments aid the
institutions by releasing university funds for non-secular uses.22 The court
emphasized the fact that the students are the direct recipients of the
awards, indicating that the grants might have been invalidated had they
been awarded directly to the institutions.
The "child benefit" theory has been utilized by the United States
Supreme Court to sustain the constitutionality of state appropriations for
the transportation of parochial school children23 and for providing textbook loans to students. 24 Prior to Rogers the theory received attention in
two Missouri cases,25 each of which declined to consider the theory as a
controlling factor in determining whether the aid was permissible.
The majority in Rogers also determined that tuition payments are not
grants "in aid of" the institutions by utilizing an "exchange of considerations" concept. 26 Although the funds for tuition grants are furnished
initially by the state, a contractual relationship exists between the university
and its students. When a student uses the grant to pay for his or her tuition,
the payment cannot be considered as a gift or donation to the university
because it creates a reciprocal obligation on the part of the university to
furnish the student with a college education.2 ' The court in Rogers maintained that the "exchange of considerations" theory could only be applied
where the school is a non-profit organization. 2' The court indicated that
tuition payments should be treated as "aid" to the university where the
amount of
tuition received exceeds the cost of providing an education to its
29
students.
There is no clear formula for determining which types of aid might be
sustained under the "exchange of considerations" theory, and its role in
30
sustaining future appropriations to non-public schools is questionable.
The applicability of the theory is limited in at least three respects. First, it is
clear that the schools receiving the tuition payments must be operated on a
non-profit basis. Secondly, the theory can be utilized only where a private
contractual relationship exists between the school and its students. Finally,
where the contract is to provide aid or services of a religious nature, or
where the school receiving the aid is distinctly religious in character, the aid
21. Particular reference to "aid" or "support" is made in Mo. CONsT. art. I, §§

6-7, art. IX, § 8. See note 6 supra.

22. 538 S.W.2d at 717.
23. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.1 (1947).
24. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
25. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. En Banc 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1111 (1975); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (En Banc 1953).
26. See Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695,700 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
27. Id. at 700.

28. 538 S.W.2d at 721.
29. Id.
30. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/6
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cannot be upheld on an "exchange of considerations" basis.3 It is doubtful
that statutory provisions for textbook loans or transportation for parochial
school children could be sustained on this basis because the educational
institution owes no contractual obligation to its students with respect to any
benefit it may receive from such a program. It is conceivable that tuition
grants to students attending private elementary or secondary schools could
be upheld by applying the same "exchange of considerations" 'rationale
used in Rogers. Yet the United States Supreme Court has invalidated statefunded tuition grants to private elementary schools on the ground that
excessive administrative oversight would have been necessary to ensure
that the aid complied with the "primary effect" test.32
Although the "child benefit" and "exchange of considerations"
theories provided the means for broadening the scope of permissible aid to
private schools in Missouri, the court in Rogers restricted their applicability
to aid at the college level. The court pointed out a significant factual
distinction between the availability of educational opportunities at the
college level and at the elementary or secondary level. In the latter instance, tax money is used to support a free educational system. As a consequence, the parents' choice to send their children to a private school is a
self-imposed burden, and expenditures for those who reject the free education are constitutionally prohibited.33 Because a free education is unavailable to college students, the state presumably has a greater interest in
subsidizing students through individual tuition grants, regardless of
whether the students attend public or non-public colleges.34 Prior Missouri
decisions prohibiting appropriations at the elementary and secondary
levels were emphatically supported by the majority in Rogers on this
ground. 35 The United States Supreme Court has also distinguished between the two educational levels, but on a different basis. The Supreme
Court has declared that children at the lower level are particularly susceptible to religious indoctrination, especially where the pressure to conform to
religious practices is exerted by the teachers or by the distinctly religious
character of the school. The Court has invalidated state aid flowing to
parochial schools in which this coercive atmosphere prevailed because the
character of the schools impaired students' first amendment free exercise
rights.36 Although the Missouri Supreme Court completely foreclosed state
aid to elementary and secondary schools, the United States Supreme Court
has been willing to sustain the aid where the coercive effect of religious
indoctrination was greatly minimized.
The court in Rogers also sustained the constitutionality of the Missouri
31. See text accompanying note 40 infra.
32. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973). See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
33. 538 S.W.2d at 720-21.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 720.
36. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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Financial Assistance Program under federal standards. 37 First, the court
stated that the statute had a secular purpose.3 8 Both state and federal
courts have consistently recognized that an educated citizenry contributes
to the economic and social welfare of the state. Legislation designed to
facilitate the opportunity of children to get an education clearly has a
secular purpose.
The court in Rogers also concluded that the statutory program did not
have a primary effect which advances religion. 9 The "primary effect" test
requires that the aid not flow to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the
religious mission and that the aid not fund a specifically religious activity in
an otherwise substantially secular setting.40 Without examining the character
of the particular institutions involved, the court in Rogers stated that these
requirements were met. However, the United States Supreme Court has
sustained the constitutionality of state aid in challenges similar to Rogers
only after first examining the schools receiving aid in order to ascertain
whether the "primary effect" text is satisfied. 4' In light of this practice of
the Supreme Court, it is clear that in future challenges of appropriations
under the Missouri statutory program the Missouri courts must consider
whether the schools receiving tuition payments meet the "primary effect"
test. Thus, even though the Missouri statutory program is facially constitutional, some tuition grants to college students may be invalid if the schools
benefitting from such grants serve predominantly religious purposes.
The court in Rogers further determined that the implementation of
the statutory program did not excessively entangle the state in church
affairs. 42 The absence of state administrative oversight and the diminished
coercive effect of religious influences at the college level sufficiently guard
against excessive church-state involvement. At the elementary level the
threat of religious indoctrination necessitates greater state administrative
supervision, and the federal courts are more inclined to invalidate the state
aid on the ground of excessive church-state entanglement. *
In light of the foregoing Missouri and federal theories on aid to nonpublic schools it is not likely that Rogers will have any significant impact on
the impermissibility of appropriating public money to provide transportation to children attending private schools in Missouri. This is especially true
if income from the Public School Fund were to be used to fund such
transportation because it is prohibited by the Missouri Constitution.4 3 Fur37. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
38. 538 S.W.2d at 717.
39. Id. at 721. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
40. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
41. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762 (1976). See also Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682
(1971).
42. 538 S.W.2d at 718.
43. McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (En Banc 1953).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/6
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thermore, transportation of students at the elementary and secondary
levels is disfavored on the ground that the decision of the parents to send
their children to private schools is a self-imposed burden which should not
be alleviated by the state.
Similarly, statutory authorization to provide tuition grants to children
attending such schools cannot reasonably be expected to receive favor in
the face of the "self-imposed burden" argument. The United States Supreme Court also has stricken this type of aid because an excessive churchstate involvement is necessary to protect against unconstitutional use of the
44
funds.

There is a much greater likelihood that a statutory program providing
funds for textbook loans to students attending private colleges will be
sustained as a result of Rogers. If such a program is to be upheld it must
provide the textbooks directly to the students and not to the institutions. In
addition, the program must provide statutory safeguards similar to those in
Rogers to insure that the state agency administering the program complies
with constitutional standards. 45 The United States Supreme Court has
upheld textbook loans to elementary schools, 46 thus removing any impediment at the federal level. However, the Supreme Court has invalidated
state appropriations for the purchase and loan of instructional materials
other than books, reusable workbooks, or manuals to parochial school
children on the ground that such materials are inextricably intertwined
47
with a teaching process which is itself devoted to religious purposes.
Appropriations to private colleges for building construction grants
may be sustained as a result of Rogers. Though the court may be reluctant
to consider a grant made to the institution as a direct benefit to the student,
the grant possibly could be considered an exchange for the university's
agreement to use the buildings solely for secular purposes. 48 Construction
grants to private colleges have been sustained by the United States Su44. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
45. In Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760 (1976), the United
States Supreme Court indicated that such statutory programs must include a
specific prohibition against the use of aid for religious purposes in order to satisfy
constitutional requirements.
46. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
47. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977). In Wolman these instructional
materials included projectors, tape recorders, record players, maps, globes, science
kits, weather forcasting charts, and the like. Id. at 2606.
48. See 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 268, 174
N.Y.S.2d 1, 150 N.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958), in which the City of
New York sold land to Fordham University for less than the purchase price paid by
the city. The New York Court of Appeals held that the difference in price was not a
gift or subsidy to the university, but was an "exchange of consideration" for the
university's agreement to raze the buildings, relocate the tenants, and use the
property for a college campus only.
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